French Government Ends National Coordination Of Controversial €300 Mio “Third Places” Public Support Scheme

The French government has dissolved the national coordination body for its public program supporting “tiers-lieux,” or third places, ending a dedicated structure that coordinated a program that channeled nearly 300 million euros in state funds over eight years to a network that grew to more than 3,500 hybrid community and work spaces across the country.

The Groupement d’intérêt public France Tiers-Lieux, created in 2022 and extended once, formally ceased operations on June 29. Officials said national and regional animation of the places will continue through the Agence nationale de la cohésion des territoires and ordinary state programs, alongside support from local governments. Critics called the move the effective end of a targeted public policy.

The scheme’s most prominent expansion came in August 2021, when then-Prime Minister Jean Castex announced a 130 million euro package — half drawn from the France Covid Relance recovery plan — to structure and expand the ecosystem. The funds targeted five priorities: creating 100 “manufactures de proximité” focused on shared production workshops; expanding professional training; financing 3,000 civic service positions; training digital counselors; and strengthening national and regional networks. The stated intention was to harness a grassroots movement as a driver of social cohesion, local employment, training, cultural activity and production in often-underserved areas, creating leverage rather than pure ongoing subsidies.

Third places are hybrid spaces — neither home nor traditional workplace — that combine shared work areas, workshops, cultural activities, training and community services to foster collaboration and local projects.

The program proved controversial from early on within the fully private coworking scene, particularly over the risk of unfair competition with purely commercial coworking operators. Public subsidies, reduced rents or free access to municipal buildings allowed some subsidized places to offer lower-cost or more flexible desks and services to freelancers, startups and small firms — the same clients targeted by private chains and independent commercial coworking spaces concentrated in larger cities. Industry observers and some local business groups noted that without strict limits to clear public-interest missions, the aid could distort local markets.

An early national mapping by the 2018 Mission Coworking found that about 76 percent of the roughly 1,463 identified places had coworking as their dominant activity, with the remainder oriented more toward fab labs and makerspaces. That high share of work-space functions fueled the competition concerns, especially in urban and suburban markets where private operators already operated.

Yet a substantial share of the network took root where commercial offerings remain scarce. Roughly one-third of places are in rural areas and a majority sit outside the main metropolitan zones, often in small towns. In those locations, private coworking is frequently unprofitable or nonexistent; the hybrid model has filled gaps in services, production space and social infrastructure that pure commercial operators rarely reach.

An independent evaluation of the flagship “Fabriques de territoire” labeling and funding program, conducted by Agence Phare for the national cohesion agency, found the support had a decisive effect on structuring, professionalization and multi-activity development. It helped places open more widely to territorial needs, create salaried coordination roles and aggregate services that would not survive alone. Many places have since diversified revenue streams beyond subsidies; early data already showed roughly half of income coming from rents, services, events and other own resources, with that share rising for more mature sites.

The same evaluation, however, highlighted persistent weaknesses. Dependence on public money remained high for many places, employment was often precarious and short-term, openness beyond core communities proved uneven, and the places’ ability to systematically support the emergence of new neighboring initiatives fell short of ambitions. Professionalization advanced in the form of paid facilitators and more regular activity, yet the evaluation warned that volunteer reliance and contract turnover limited long-term capitalization of skills and models.

With dedicated national credits cut sharply — from around 13 million euros in recent years toward roughly 1 million euros or less — the places now shift toward ordinary state schemes, European funds, local authority support and greater self-financing. The national engineering and networking platform is gone.

Survival prospects vary. Hybrid places that have diversified revenues, built strong local partnerships and rooted themselves in genuine territorial needs stand a reasonable chance of continuing. Purely social or heavily grant-dependent sites in the most fragile rural areas face higher risk of contraction or closure. Proponents estimate that without renewed coordinated support, 20 to 25 percent of the network could struggle in the near term. The government maintains that the initial investment achieved its structuring goal and that the movement is now mature enough to operate under common-law frameworks. Whether thousands of third places remain a durable feature of France’s territorial landscape will depend largely on local political will and the places’ own ability to balance social mission with economic resilience.